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Coercive Anti-Proliferation
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This article examines the issue of coercively preventing states from acquiring and 
possessing nuclear weapons. In questioning whether such coercion is morally 
legitimate, I argue that Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) political theory contains 
important resources compared with three rival perspectives: Realpolitik, the Just War 
Tradition, and Deontological Pacifism. I also argue that coercive anti-proliferation 
measures are conditionally legitimated by three distinctive Kantian concepts: 
First, his concept of International Justice allows for coercion against genuinely 
aggressive states engaged in nuclear aspiration. Second, given the imperfections of 
international justice institutions, his concept of a State of Peoples—an authorized 
global governance body—seems to provide a better guarantee of just forms of 
coercive nuclear anti-proliferation. Third, supplementing the first two concepts, Kant 
discusses a Cosmopolitan Right to share the earth’s surface. This concept justifies 
coercive anti-proliferation when a people’s right to existence as citizens of the earth is 
threatened by nuclear weapons. 
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Introduction
Since their development and use 68 years ago, nuclear weapons have posed a 
fundamental challenge in world politics. The Cold War conflict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union was made more dangerous, yet also, some 
think, more stable as a result of these weapons.1 Other powers including Great 
Britain, France, and China sought quickly to join the so-called nuclear club. 
Subsequently, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons beyond that club has 
been the core interest of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet preventing 
states like Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea from acquiring them has 
proved impossible, despite the centerpiece of that regime, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Although this regime is based primarily on 
diplomatic and persuasive forms of preventive action, coercive measures have 
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recently become more salient (Meier and Daase 2013). Labels like counter-
proliferation and anti-proliferation have been coined to describe such measures.
The use of military force to prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons 
has a long and controversial history. As far back as World War II, in specific 
campaigns in the general war effort, the Allied states thwarted Nazi Germany’s 
nuclear program (Malin 2013, 90-1). After the war, with the exception of 
legitimate self-defence, the United Nations (UN) Charter outlawed military force 
against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state unless 
authorized by the Security Council. The preventive use of force is generally 
viewed as illegal (Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert 2012, 135). Thus, Israel’s 
preventive strike in 1981 against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear program was condemned in 
the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Similarly, the U.S.-led coalition 
against Iraq in 2003 to eliminate an alleged weapons of mass destruction program 
was condemned by most of the international community as illegal, unnecessary, 
and dangerous; yet by joining the coalition, at least some states endorsed the need 
for preventive action (Tesón 2005). 
Focusing on the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) 
political theory, this article analyzes the moral legitimacy of using coercion to 
prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although Kant lived in a pre-
nuclear world, the generality of his theory provides important resources for 
analyzing the profound challenges such weapons pose to a just world order. 
Compared with three alternative perspectives on international justice—
Realpolitik, the Just War Tradition, and Deontological Pacifism—Kantian theory 
supports a multidimensional, principled perspective on the ethics of coercion in 
world politics. While opposed to the use of unauthorized and unjust international 
coercion, his theory grounds anti-proliferation measures by virtue of three 
concepts: 
•  International Justice, which permits coercion to vindicate inter-state rights to 
freedom from aggression;
•  The State of Peoples, the existence of a legitimate and competent world political and 
juridical authority to use coercion against threats to a wider community of states 
and individuals;
•  Cosmopolitan Right, a guarantee that, as citizens of the earth, people have freedom 
not just from inter-state aggression or from the problems of incomplete justice 
mechanisms, but to a share of the earth’s surface. 
These three Kantian concepts are relevant to current debates on nuclear weapons. 
Given the weaknesses of the global non-proliferation regime, and the possibility 
of new, threatening aspirants, it is likely that states will seek more robust anti-
proliferation measures. How such measures are justified will matter greatly 
for their overall legitimacy. My application of Kantian theory suggests that 
traditional rationales for coercively hindering nuclear aspirants are insufficient 
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because they are based on a clear-cut distinction between nuclear aggressors and 
innocent would-be victims. While such a distinction is central to conventional 
understandings of international justice, it is ultimately inadequate because of 
the questionable authoritative competence to apply military force justly in a 
decentralized world order. Moreover, traditional rationales are limited because 
they ignore the danger that nuclear weapons pose, not just for sovereign states, 
but for people as global citizens. Thus, Kantian theory provides a critical resource 
for assessing the limits of preventive force within the current non-proliferation 
regime. 
This article has two main sections. In the first, I outline the relevant 
differences among three perspectives on the political morality of war, peace, and 
nuclear weapons: Realpolitik, the Just War Tradition, and Deontological Pacifism. 
Although Kant is often placed in the Deontological category, in the second 
section I demonstrate how this is too narrow a reading of his political theory, 
particularly as regards the more specific problem of preventing the immoral 
acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. Section two also outlines how the three 
Kantian concepts discussed above apply to the problem of justifying the use of 
coercion as a tool of nuclear anti-proliferation. 
Three Perspectives on Ethics, War, and Nuclear Weapons 
Kant’s political theory incorporates, but supersedes, the core insights of three 
salient perspectives on the ethics of war, peace, and nuclear weapons: Realpolitik, 
the Just War Tradition, and Deontological Pacifism. This section establishes 
the relative uniqueness of Kant’s vision of international justice as a basis for 
unpacking the relevance of his key concepts to the problem of justifying coercive 
nuclear anti-proliferation. 
Realpolitik 
Kenneth N. Waltz is an important contemporary exponent of Realpolitik. His 
famous argument that the spread of more nuclear weapons “may be better” than 
the pursuit of non-proliferation is hotly disputed (Sagan and Waltz 2013).2 For 
Waltz, policy on nuclear weapons should not be based on moralistic or knee-jerk 
fears of their potential use but on the “military logic of self-help systems” (Sagan 
and Waltz 2013, 4). In a condition of anarchy, states must provide the means 
for their own survival and self-protection. Although Waltz avoids an explicit 
discussion of ethics, he clearly adheres to the basic assumptions of Realpolitik: 
State leaders have no obligations per se to other states and, therefore, they have a 
morally unconstrained liberty to take any actions necessary to guarantee national 
self-protection vis-à-vis others (see Forde 1993). 
Waltz concedes that under certain circumstances the spread of nuclear 
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weapons would warrant anti-proliferation policies. If nuclear aspirants were 
to use the weapon to make a “blackmailer’s threat more effective, then nuclear 
weapons are bad for the world” (Sagan and Waltz 2013, 5). Yet he asserts this 
is theoretically possible but unlikely in the real world. Historically, rather than 
blackmail, states have used nuclear weapons only for “defence and deterrence, 
[policies that] are made easier and more reliable by the spread of nuclear 
weapons.” Moreover, we should judge nuclear weapons not by abstract ethical 
categories of rightness but by whether the “use of force is more or less likely and 
in ways that promise to be more or less destructive” (Sagan and Waltz 2013, 
5). Thus, Waltz’s version of Realpolitik holds that nuclear weapons have been a 
positive force because they reduced the utility of war in the post-World War II 
era: 
Remarkably, general war was avoided in a period of rapid and far-reaching change: 
decolonization; the rapid economic growth of some states; the formation and 
tightening of blocks; and the eventual dissolution of one of them; the development of 
new technologies; and the emergence of new strategies for fighting guerrilla wars and 
deterring nuclear ones (Sagan and Waltz 2013, 4). 
He concludes that even if systemic global counter-proliferation were possible, 
we would lose a weapon that allows the anarchic system to “absorb changes 
and contain conflicts and hostilities” (Sagan and Waltz 2013, 4). For Waltz, 
today’s counter-proliferation practices, led by the United States, rest on dubious 
Eurocentric assumptions about which states can be trusted to rationally utilize a 
nuclear capability (Sagan and Waltz 2013, 3, 14). 
The Just War Tradition
For the Just War Tradition, I take Michael Walzer to be the most interesting 
contemporary representative. In general, Walzer follows the presumption in 
this tradition that moral judgements about right and wrong are possible even in 
the proverbial state of nature. However, he gives this tradition a modern, liberal 
orientation by arguing that state rights to freedom from aggression are based on 
the human rights of their individual human members (Walzer 1977, 53). When 
a political community is forced by another state to fight, it is the people that are 
victims of aggression and who must resort to a just war (Walzer 1977, 51-2). 
This is a fairly conventional and widely accepted morality, but is it plausible 
in a nuclear world? Strikingly, Walzer writes that “[n]uclear weapons explode 
the theory of just war. They are the first of mankind’s technological innovations 
that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world” (Walzer 
1977, 282). War’s ostensible political utility as a tool for aggression/resistance 
to aggression may no longer hold intact with such weapons. The scale of death 
and destruction from nuclear weapons seems impossible to justify. “And yet,” 
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he reflects, “there are other notions, also familiar, having to do with aggression 
and the right of self-defence, that seem to require exactly that threat [of using 
them]” (Walzer 1977, 282). Here Walzer searches for something practical in 
the underlying foundations of the Just War Tradition to support a conditional 
permission for nuclear deterrence. With some ambivalence, he concludes that 
the Cold War situation of “mutually assured destruction” leaves leaders little 
opportunity for moral purity. To use the weapons in war is immoral and admits 
no exception. But to engage in a “kind of bluff ” (Walzer 1977, 271) in which 
one prepares and threatens “to kill, is not same as killing.” Yet it is “frighteningly 
close—else it would not work” (270). 
Nuclear deterrence in the Cold War meant leaders and their societies 
engaged in a form of “criminality,” in Walzer’s assessment (Walzer 1977, 283).3 Yet 
such criminality can be excused under the label “supreme emergency” (Walzer 
1977, 251-59; 2005, 33-50). These situations do not eviscerate a human capacity 
and duty for moral choice. Rather, such duties are suspended because of the risks 
involved in being strictly moral under dangerous circumstances. How is this 
ultimately different from Realpolitik? Walzer rejects the notion that states qua 
states simply respond amorally to external stimuli by doing whatever things are 
needed to survive. Instead, he claims that just states respond to a dangerous world 
by refraining from aggression and by resisting—as far as possible—doing evil 
things in the process of resisting others’ aggression. For Walzer, when the Cold 
War ended, a nuclear supreme emergency also ended because the Soviet Union 
ceased to exist, thus removing any justification for the United States’ “unwilling 
criminality”: “We [in the U.S.] accepted the risk of nuclear war in order to avoid 
the risk, not of ordinary, but of totalitarian subjugation” (Walzer 2005, 48-9).  
The end of that risk today means that just, liberal states, like the United 
States, no longer have moral permission to resort to the moral criminality of 
deterrence vis-à-vis less threatening, but, by all means, potentially dangerous 
nuclear aspirants. Here Walzer employs the Just War Tradition free from the 
shadows of a “supreme emergency” to argue that the United States and other just 
states may use coercion for counter-proliferation against unjust states. If needed, 
such coercion may be unilateral or preventive, depending on the circumstances. 
He suggests that although Israel needed military force in 1981 against Iraq’s 
nuclear program, the United States could have used coercive inspections and 
containment measures “short of war” against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 
(Walzer 2005, 148). Despite disagreeing with the Bush administration’s policy of 
regime change in Iraq, Walzer believes unjust nuclear aspirants generally need 
to be coerced and controlled. In a statement that applies to Waltz as much as it 
does to the political Left, Walzer complains of “a constant temptation of antiwar 
politics: to pretend there really isn’t a serious enemy out there…. This pretence 
certainly keeps things simple, but it is wrong in every possible way.” It is “insane” 
he claims, to believe that conventional deterrence can prevent unjust leaders in 
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many of today’s would-be nuclear states from using the weapons as a means of 
blackmail or even of war (Walzer 2005, 152-53).
Deontological Pacifism
This perspective is a principled critique of both Realpolitik and the Just War 
Tradition. Putting the words Deontology and Pacifism together in a single 
perspective requires a brief explanation. Unlike with Realpolitik and certain 
core tenets of the Just War Tradition, a Deontological approach holds that 
“actions should be judged by their inherent rightness and validity not by the 
goodness or badness of policy outcomes” (Amstutz 2013, 74). Where Waltz 
views the acceptability of nuclear weapons, deterrence, and proliferation from 
the standpoint of whether they produce stability, and Walzer struggles to find a 
conditional permission for the weapons for deterrence in a “supreme emergency,” 
a deontologist would take a completely different view: It is never permissible to 
use an immoral means to achieve an end, even one that is morally good. “Pacifism” 
is normally based on a Deontological premise: War is wrong because it involves 
killing and human suffering (Lackey 1989, 6). Taken together, a Deontological 
Pacifist perspective argues that war is never a morally valid instrument for 
collective self-protection and resisting aggression. It follows for many adherents 
of this perspective that possessing nuclear weapons is impermissible precisely 
because they threaten mass killing (Lackey 1989, 131).  
In many key respects, Kant is an obvious illustrative exponent of 
Deontological Pacifism. His categorical imperative is a textbook example of 
deontological ethics (Stewart 2009, 35; but see Wood 2008). Two key formulations 
of the imperative are relevant to this discussion of war and nuclear weapons: 
•  The Formula of Universal Law: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become 
   through your will a universal law of nature” (italics in original, Kant 1964, 89). 
•  The Formula of the End in Itself: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, 
but always at the same time as an end” (Kant 1964, 96).
At a very general level, the use of violence to resolve conflicts fails these two 
formulations of the moral law. War cannot be universalized without contradiction 
as a just means of rights-vindication; and wars tend to degrade humans as 
instruments of killing and targets of destruction. The impact of the categorical 
imperative on Kant’s approach to international politics is clear: “Now moral-
practical reason in us pronounces its irresistible veto: There shall be no war, 
neither between me and you in the state of nature, nor between us as states... 
this is not the manner in which everyone ought to seek his right” (Kant 2006a, 
148). His advocacy of a “perpetual peace” league among states and for national 
disarmament are ultimately borne by the deontological logic of the categorical 
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imperative (Kant 2006b). 
During the 1980s, Deontological Pacifists drew from the categorical 
imperative to support  “an unequivocal opposition to nuclear proliferation and a 
corresponding requirement that all states undertake unilateral and global nuclear 
disarmament without condition” (Doyle 2010, 91). Yet there are two vexing 
problems with this opposition and such requirements: First, how are states to 
credibly ensure their survival and self-protection?; and second, with respect to 
nuclear weapons, how are states to implement the demands of ethics when others 
are unwilling (or, in their view, “unable”) to disarm? Kant is far more nuanced 
a political thinker than some of his interpreters have made it seem (see Doyle 
2010).  
To summarize, I argue that Kant’s political theory is multi-faceted because 
it absorbs key aspects of all three traditions discussed above, Realpolitik, Just 
War, and Deontological Pacifism. Yet he orders the central elements of each in a 
way that limits their weaknesses. First, like Waltz, Kant accepts that the anarchic 
structure of world politics leaves states in a situation of self-help, independent 
to pursue self-protection as they see fit (Kant 2006b, 79-80; 2006a, 111). Yet, 
second, like Walzer, Kant accepts that, even in a state of anarchy, some actions 
constitute unjust aggression and states have an individual and collective right 
to coercively resist (2006a, 140; see also Orend 2000; compare with Willisams 
2012). Thus, Kant rejects pacifism as a short term response to injustice. Third, 
however, like Deontological Pacifism, Kant rejects the amoralism of Realpolitik 
and the expediency that too often creeps into the Just War Tradition, exemplified 
by Walzer’s “supreme emergency” category. National or collective self-protection 
may only occur through principled or universally permitted actions that respect 
the humanity of the species, as discussed in the next section. Finally, any coercive 
means used by states to ensure self-protection, individually or collectively, must 
not prevent the eventual realization of lasting peace and justice. Kant’s political 
theory thus combines an appreciation of the demands and dilemmas of self-
help in anarchy, of the inherent justness of countering aggression, and of the 
imperative for pursuing moral means to achieving peace. The next section 
advances and applies the multi-dimensionality of Kant’s political theory to 
the more specific issue of the legitimacy of using coercion to prevent nuclear 
acquisition.
Kantian Political Theory and Coercive Anti-Proliferation
When do states or international institutions have the moral authority to 
coercively prevent a state from achieving nuclear weapons capability? I argue that 
there are three concepts in Kantian political theory that lend support to coercive 
anti-proliferation under certain circumstances. These concepts are derived 
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from his principal texts on political theory, especially but not exclusively The 
Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 2006a) and “Perpetual Peace” (Kant 2006b). First, 
the concept of International Justice allows coercion based on a right of states 
to self-protection from aggression. The second and third Kantian concepts are 
more radical and original and require an elaboration of how they apply to nuclear 
issues; they suggest that coercive authority is not reducible to situations of inter-
state aggression presumed by the concept of International Justice. Thus, the State 
of Peoples and Cosmopolitan Right give distinctive bases for rethinking current 
international practices and institutions for coercing nuclear aspirants. 
International Justice: Preventing Aggression 
Coercive anti-proliferation generally finds support in Kant’s concept of 
International Justice, the right of states to self-defence. Yet there are two sides 
to the coin of International Justice: acting to prevent aggression may also entail 
recognizing a permission of states to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive 
reasons.
With respect to the first side of the coin, Thomas Doyle (2010, 104) argues 
that Kant’s theory allows states to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability because 
of a moral right to self-defence. Neither the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) regime nor the possibility of instability due to arms racing can 
override such a basic right (Doyle 2010, 107). If Kantian theory accepts this 
right, then it would be difficult to locate in his texts a blanket right of states 
or the UN to coercively prevent nuclear acquisition. Yet the other side of the 
coin of International Justice logically entails the right of states to coercively 
thwart the aspirant state’s designs. Thus, the International Justice rationale for 
counter-proliferation encounters the problem of the security dilemma and the 
contradictions and indeterminacy that results. Applied in an anarchic context, 
International Justice both permits and disallows nuclear acquisitions. This is so 
even where cooperative organizations like the UN exist or where legal regimes 
like the NPT are in effect. 
There is no easy way out of this indeterminacy built within the International 
Justice rationale for coercion. But the stakes are extraordinarily high given the 
nature of the weapons. States that continue to feel threatened will seek to acquire 
weapons; and others will, on the same basis, seek to prevent the aspirants. 
Kantian theory explains that each has a provisional or conditional title to acquire/
coerce. Managing this problem is not simply a prudential issue but a moral task. 
A moral politician, according to Kant, seeks to reform existing international laws, 
practices, and policies to dismantle what on the surface seem like intractable 
dilemmas (Kant 2006b, 101-04). The NPT, the current system of vindicating 
rights in relation to the distribution of the entitlement to possess weapons, 
clearly needs reform. Moreover, the Security Council as the mechanism for 
preventing aggressive nuclear acquisition needs reform. The conceptual limits 
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of International Justice as a justification for coercive anti-proliferation suggest 
a need to go beyond a focus on inter-state aggression as the core moral issue at 
stake with nuclear weapons. For this reason, there is value in considering the two 
other concepts within Kant’s political theory that, in principle, support coercive 
anti-proliferation. 
Enforcement by a State of Peoples 
Kant’s solution to the international state of nature is a perpetual peace federation 
(Kant 2006b). Such a federation can be viewed as a developed, mature version of 
international anarchy; it is an association capable of reducing the indeterminacy 
of rights claims. But it has no coercive authority over states. Kant suggests this 
federation is indispensible yet imperfect compared to a better concept, a State of 
Peoples: 
As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no other 
way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains only war, than for 
them to relinquish, just as do individual human beings, their wild (lawless) freedom, 
to accustom themselves to public binding laws, and thereby to form a state of peoples 
(civitas gentium), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all the 
peoples of the world (Kant 2006b, 81). 
Kant recognizes that states do not “want the positive idea of a world republic 
at all (thus rejecting in hypothesi [practice] what is right in thesi [theory]), 
[and therefore we must endorse]… only the negative surrogate of a lasting and 
continually expanding federation that prevents war [and] can curb the inclination 
to hostility and defiance of the law, though there is the constant threat of its 
breaking loose again” (Kant 2006b, 81). 
Typically, the State of Peoples concept is overlooked in Kant’s political 
theory. Yet scholars like Pauline Kleingeld (2004; 2012, 49-58) and Georg 
Cavallar (1999, 122-31) have elevated its importance. They suggest that Kant’s 
apparent rejection of the concept is conditional rather than total. It is clear Kant 
resisted the idea that a State of Peoples could be imposed on states coercively; for 
moral reasons, states must develop a shared idea of justice and then be willing 
to impose it on themselves. In other words, the State of Peoples is something 
states may gradually accept over time once they learn to trust each other and 
have undergone supportive domestic constitutional changes that dovetail with 
a peaceful international order. My objective here is not to argue that we need 
to wait for perfect conditions or until a State of Peoples forms to authorize the 
coercive prevention of nuclear acquisitions. Rather, the point is that the State of 
Peoples concept usefully reveals limits in current practices in the global non-
proliferation regime. 4
Theoretically, if states grow more accustomed to the idea of submitting 
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themselves to public binding laws, and form a State of Peoples, what difference 
would it make? Juridically, coercion would be a matter of living under commonly 
accepted laws rather than under alien powers or of simply using force as an 
instrument of self-protection (see Kant 2006b, 78). If a State of Peoples emerges, 
then coercion in relation to nuclear acquisition would be qualitatively different 
than it is with International Justice. One could only conceive of states growing 
accustomed to submitting to a common external, coercive constraint after (or 
at least simultaneous with) global nuclear disarmament. If, as Kant suggests, 
a negative surrogate of a peace federation depends on the promise of eventual 
disarmament, it would apply a forteriori to states that have grown accustomed 
to submitting to external laws.5 After that point, a state’s policy to acquire 
nuclear weapons would pose a “constitutional” challenge to the State of Peoples, 
analogous perhaps to a rebellion from the shared vision of international justice 
that underpinned its legitimate establishment. Sudden acquisition and/or 
possession would be automatically injurious to the rights of all others, and would 
be subject to coercive prevention as a matter of law enforcement. Self-defence 
claims by such a state would not be a legitimate excuse to acquire the weapons. 
In a State of Peoples context, we can imagine that the possession of nuclear 
technologies would be coercively controlled. But coercion need not involve the 
use of military force as the first or final basis for guaranteeing the law. For Kant, 
coercion is principally about an external hindrance on freedom consistent with 
the freedom of all (Kant 2006a; see also Ripstein 2009); it is not dependent solely 
on the threat or use of physical force. Ideally, lawful coercion can be achieved 
without recourse to violence. Similar to Walzer’s comment that “moral talk is 
coercive” (1977, 12), Kant suggests that the transcendental principle of publicity 
has a coercive effect (Kant 2006b, 106). A State of Peoples would therefore also 
presuppose that all uses of nuclear technologies are civilian and, therefore, 
publically observable and monitored. 
The current institutional order may be described as being based on a 
mixture of conventional concepts of International Justice and a non-proliferation 
control regime. The former distinguishes between aggression and peace rather 
than among categories of weapons. The latter is premised on the notion that 
nuclear weapons pose a special concern compared to conventional weapons, 
and they require an exceptional set of (albeit, in the first instance voluntary) 
control arrangements. The UN Charter and the Security Council’s specific 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security are premised on a 
substantial acceptance of the basic theory of aggression within the International 
Justice concept. The 1968 NPT, the centerpiece of the non-proliferation regime, is 
premised, formally at least, on the notion that civilian use of nuclear technology 
ought to be the only kind permissible for states (much like the Baruch Plan). As 
is well known, the NPT’s legitimacy is constantly challenged by the fact that the 
states legally permitted to possess nuclear weapons have not yet acted on the 
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obligation to disarm, and show no signs of moving in that direction. Moreover, 
the non-proliferation regime has been interpreted recently by some states in 
the UN—particularly Western states—as requiring more coercive policing and 
controlling of certain non-nuclear states under the NPT such as Iran (Meier and 
Daase 2013). 
Compared with a State of Peoples, the problems of the current institutional 
order stand out. The continued reliance on an unreconstructed theory of 
aggression within a decentralized, anarchic order permits states to defend 
themselves. The NPT allows only some states to use nuclear weapons as a means 
to deter attack. Allowing nuclear entitlements to some and not others and then 
using the notion of law enforcement to coercively prevent nuclear acquisitions 
is an unjust order. This is because it combines an acceptance of self-help and 
self-protection for some states and the threat of external coercive control over 
others. As Doyle (2009) argues, such an international order is unjust and could be 
rightfully resisted as unfair. While many defend the non-proliferation regime as 
better than complete nuclear anarchy (or “anything goes”), an arguably better and 
morally relevant baseline is found in the Kantian concept of the State of Peoples.
Enforcing a Cosmopolitan Right to Share the Earth
For Kant, Cosmopolitan Right is not merely an afterthought to domestic and 
international politics; it is a “necessary supplement” to these other domains 
(2006b, 85). His discussion of this right focuses heavily on the notion of 
hospitality, that is, rules that govern a host in relation to guests. People have 
an inherent right to travel and make contact with other peoples, and to not be 
received with hostility or in ways that endanger their lives. Hosts have a right 
to limit or contain such contacts to preserve their distinct homeland. But his 
discussion of hospitality is enlarged as it becomes clear that Cosmopolitan 
Right is a branch of a more general metaphysics of morals. Trading relations are 
governed under this principle as are prohibitions on imperialism and colonialism, 
whereby the visitors overwhelm and dispossess the “homeowners.” 
There is an underlying unity to these issues raised under Cosmopolitan 
Right: Persons have “the right of common possession of the surface of the earth” 
(Kant 2006b, 82). They have a right to settle and live on some part without 
denying others the same. Jeremy Waldron (2000) argues that Kant’s cosmopolitan 
theory is principally about the ethics of living side-by-side within the earth’s 
bounded spatial limits.  Following Waldron’s interpretation, I raise here the 
implications of cosmopolitan right for coercing a state’s acquisition of nuclear 
weapons.
Nuclear weapons raise exactly the issues that are central to Kant’s concept 
of Cosmopolitan Right. In some ways, they are like any other issues that affect—
negatively or positively—the rights of people to share the earth’s surface, such as 
migration, trade, war, and imperialism. In others, however, nuclear weapons raise 
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unique and special considerations. 
Historically, Kant argues that human beings and societies are driven by a 
dialectic of “unsocial sociability” (2006c, 4). We are curious about others and 
want to interact with them. But this curiosity is limited. At the very same time, 
we seek to force our own conception of justice on others and fear people that may 
pose a challenge to our values. The entire surface of the earth, even the seemingly 
most uninhabitable parcels, became populated—as someone’s “home,” through 
human practices like war (driving people apart) and trade (supplying people with 
goods unavailable at “home”). But once the entire surface has been populated, 
and there is no real possibility that war and disagreement can push humans to 
hitherto uninhabited corners, we must finally accept the need to live together 
side-by-side. This has implications both for how subsequently acknowledged 
claims to homelands are treated, and also for any actions that affect the very basic 
right to survive and coexist on the planet. 
In principle, weaponized nuclear technology is just like any other tool 
invented by humans within the dialectic of unsocial sociability. If nuclear 
weapons can be used within the political bounds of warfare, as a way to drive 
away threats of invasion, they are no different than conventional weapons. Yet 
neither war nor nuclear weapons are containable within ethical boundaries. Kant 
believes that political violence degenerates into a “a war of extermination” (2006b, 
71), thus challenging Cosmopolitan Right. Obviously, the use of nuclear weapons 
for deterrence potentially slides into exactly this.
In practice, then, the acquisition of nuclear weapons has unique and 
special implications for Cosmopolitan Right. Like genocide, the use of nuclear 
weapons resolves the problem of living-side-by side in a way that threatens the 
right of peoples to exist as such. When a state leader like Iran’s former president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad speaks of wiping Israel from the map, he seems to 
be threatening exactly the right to share the earth.6 The same might be said of 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s reported rhetoric about his preparedness 
to “annihilate the enemy.”7 Acquisition of nuclear weapons with this intent is 
especially alarming—and violates not just the particular rights of Israelis (or 
South Koreans and Americans), but the principle of Cosmopolitan Right. As Kant 
writes, “The growing prevalence of a (narrower or wider) community among the 
peoples of the earth has now reached a point at which the violation of right at any 
one place on the earth is felt in all places” (2006b, 84). 
This raises the question of whether there is an authority to coerce a state’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons on distinctly cosmopolitan grounds. I suggest that 
Kant’s political theory supports a coercive entitlement here that is conceptually 
distinguishable from the two others discussed above related to International 
Justice and the State of Peoples. This entitlement has exactly the same foundation 
as coercing acts of genocide. Permission to coerce on this basis falls on any actor 
that can do something to right the wrong. Allan Buchanan and Robert Keohane’s 
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(2004) proposal for a cosmopolitan institutional framework to prevent acquisition 
of weapons of mass destruction conceivably fits within this justification. 
It is also worth mentioning that nuclear weapons raise the possibility not 
just of genocide but omnicide: destruction of the human species or of the earth’s 
capacity to sustain human life. Although this prospect was more salient during 
the Cold War, the theoretical possibility remains. Kant could not conceive this. 
Yet as Peter Fenves (2003) observes, Kant seems to accept that even if, in the vast 
scope of human relations, huge numbers of the species perish through violence, 
all that is necessary for human progress—and the eventual triumph of an ethical 
commonwealth—is the survival over time of at least some peoples (see Kant 
2006b, 103). Obviously, global nuclear holocaust threatens even these people, 
those who would inherit the earth after the centuries of war endured by the 
progenitors. If coercion to uphold a right to share the earth is valid, it would be a 
forteriori valid to a threat to the species as such.
At least two objections are possible against the notion of using Kant’s concept 
of Cosmopolitan Right to ground coercion of a state’s nuclear acquisition policy. 
The first is that Kant’s texts are quite restricted and focused on specific issues 
closely related to hospitality rather than violence and war. The second is that 
Kant does not seem to allow for coercion to guarantee or vindicate Cosmopolitan 
Rights. 
These objections are not very convincing. As noted above, Kant’s apparent 
restriction of cosmopolitan right to issues of hospitality does not prevent 
application of the underlying principle to other issues. Particularly because he 
mentions trade and the moral wrong of imperialism and colonialism in relation 
to the same right, it should follow that sharing the earth’s surface, rather than 
hospitality, is his underlying concern (Kant 2006b, 82-4). Moreover, he says 
that cosmopolitan right is exactly like domestic and international right, i.e., it is 
something “ultimately regulated by public laws” (Kant 2006b, 82). And all right 
involves the authorization to coerce. Like International Justice, there may not 
be a common external constraint to guarantee consistent domains of the earth’s 
surface (as in domestic politics), but this does not nullify the rights in question.
I am not suggesting that Cosmopolitan Right by itself is a sufficient basis 
for reforming today’s institutions and practices governing nuclear weapons. Nor 
am I suggesting that a centralized or external coercive body be employed for 
cosmopolitan reasons. Simply, Cosmopolitan Right provides a non-redundant 
moral principle: Acquisition and use of nuclear technologies must be consistent 
with the principle that all people have a right to share the surface of the earth, and 
have the obligation to live together side-by-side in spite of their differences and 
fears of each other.  
Cosmopolitan Right, then, is a distinctive supplementary concept to 
International Justice and the State of Peoples. It allows an alternative basis for 
assessing the ethicality of today’s nuclear non-proliferation regime. International 
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legal rules should not hinder—to the contrary, they should promote—
technologies that would allow the world’s citizens (living in ever more dense 
conditions) to live side-by-side peacefully. The NPT’s permission for states 
to develop peaceful nuclear technologies, and promotion of an obligation for 
the peaceful sharing and transfer of the same, is consistent with this Kantian 
principle. But any use of coercion to hinder the development of civilian nuclear 
technologies in a way that prevents a people from continued use of a “home” on 
earth, or from sharing the earth’s surface, would be unjust. Equally, as discussed 
above, use of this technology with an intent to annihilate or deny a people a 
share of the earth is something that affects everyone, and is coercible. In this way, 
Kantian cosmopolitanism goes beyond a conventional theory of aggression, and 
is not reducible to self-protection for sovereign states.
Conclusion 
Since their invention, nuclear weapons have posed a challenge to conventional 
theories and practices of war and international politics. During the Cold War, 
the main issue was managing the East-West deterrent and, to a lesser degree, 
proliferation. In the past two decades, preventing proliferation to so-called 
rogue states and even terrorist non-state actors has been a more salient concern. 
At the same time, the UN Security Council has asserted itself in the area of 
coercively preventing and controlling states’ acquisition and possession of nuclear 
technologies: Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea have all been targets of sanctions. 
Iraq was invaded and subjected to regime change, albeit by a coalition of states 
that lacked uncontested Security Council authorization.
This article has examined the ethics of coercively limiting the possession 
of nuclear weapons by sovereign states. I have argued that Kant’s political 
theory contains important resources because it incorporates and surpasses the 
strengths of rival ethical approaches to nuclear weapons such as Realpolitik, the 
Just War Tradition, and Deontological Pacifism. Kant’s theory contains a strong 
presumption against the use of force. However, I have also shown how coercive 
anti-proliferation measures are morally legitimated by three concepts within 
Kantian theory. First, International Justice necessarily allows for coercion against 
genuinely aggressive states engaged in nuclear aspiration. Second, Kant shows the 
need for a State of Peoples to guarantee a just form of anti-proliferation. Third, he 
advocates a Cosmopolitan Right justification for sharing the earth’s surface, one 
that provides a distinctive and timely rationale for anti-proliferation policies in an 
era of globalization. 
The current institutional order and anti-proliferation practices are flawed 
because of ineffectiveness in justly hindering potentially aggressive nuclear 
acquisitions and in achieving general and systemic disarmament. Reforming the 
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current system requires thinking based on general principles of justice rather 
than fear of certain categories of states as such, or of historical enemies as such. 
Although Thomas Doyle (2010) is correct in using Kantian theory to show that 
nuclear acquisitions are not inherently unjust, I have argued that International 
Justice assumptions are insufficient for considering the ethicality of permitting 
and coercively preventing the spread of nuclear technologies. Thus, the State of 
Peoples and Cosmopolitan Right are important dimensions of Kantian theory 
with considerable utility for contemporary ethical and policy debates. Unlike 
Realpolitik, Kantian theory does not ignore ethical obligations among peoples. 
Unlike the Just War theory, Kantian categories do not simply “explode” in relation 
to nuclear technologies (to use Walzer’s description). This is not merely because 
Kant’s thought is, as is often remarked, so systematic and general, that particular 
political facts and worldly developments are not relevant (Flikschuh 2010, 6). To 
the contrary, it is because Kant extended and applied his account of justice to the 
actual conditions of states as they are, and people as they are, living together side-
by-side in immensely dangerous and risky conditions. 
Notes
1. Compare the view of former United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara: 
“In the end, we lucked out—it was luck that prevented nuclear war [during the Cold War],” 
(see Morris 2003) with scholars emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in creating a “long 
peace” (Gaddis 1986). 
2. Although the citations are to Sagan and Waltz, this volume consists of a debate where 
Waltz’s position is set out in his own chapters. Although I will cite both names, the focus in 
this article is on Waltz not Sagan. 
3. Walzer means “criminality” in a moral, not legal positivist sense. I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for prompting this clarification. 
4. I thank an anonymous reviewer for asking for clarification of this point. 
5. The 1946 Baruch Plan presented to the UN Atomic Energy Commission is perhaps 
the only historic precedent that anticipates, at least in the realm of nuclear weapons, a State 
of Peoples. Proposed by the U.S. government, the plan was to inter alia eliminate atomic 
weapons of mass destruction and establish international controls over the technology. The 
Soviet Union rejected the plan.
6. The Guardian. 2005. “Israel Should Be Wiped Off Map, says Iran’s President.” October 
27. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/oct/27/israel.iran  (accessed September 30, 
2013).
7. BBC News. 2013. “North Korea Ends Peace Pacts with South.” March 8. http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21709917 (accessed September 30, 2013).
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